State v. Moore Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 36578 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
4-26-2010
State v. Moore Respondent's Brief Dckt. 36578
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Moore Respondent's Brief Dckt. 36578" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2376.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2376
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO. 
COPY 
Plaintiff-Respondent, ) NO. 36578 
1 
VS . 1 






BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF BONNER 
HONORABLE JOHN L. LUSTER 
District Judge 
i*tiii?EN@E ii. WASDEN ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN 
Attorney General Deputy State Appellate 
State of Idaho Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER Boise, Idaho 83703 
Deputy Attorney General (208) 334-2712 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... I 
................................................................................ Nature of the Case I 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings ........................ 1 
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 4 
I. Moore Has Failed To Show Error Because He Was 
Not Entitled To Have The 2003 PSI Disregarded By 
Anyone ....................................................................................... 4 
A. Introduction ...................................................................... 4 
B. Standard Of Review ......................................................... 5 
C. This Court Should Affirm On The Alternative 
Basis Provided By The District Court Because 
That Basis Is Not Challenged On Appeal ........................ 5 
D. Moore Has Failed To Show Any Violation 
Of His Right Against Compelled Self-Incrimination 
Or That Restriction On The Use Of The 2003 
PSI Or 2003 PSE Would Flow From Ineffective 
.................................................... Assistance Of Counsel 7 
E. Moore Has Failed To Show That The District 
Court Had Discretion To Order The Department 
Of Correction To Disregard The 2003 PSI Or 
....................................................................... 2003 PSE 10 
II. Moore Has Failed To Show That The District Court 
............................................. Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 11 
.................................................................... A. Introduction I I 
B. Standard Of Review ....................................................... I 1 
C . Moore Has Failed To Show That The 
............ District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 11 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 15 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................... 15 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
. . ................................. Burnham v Henderson. 47 Idaho 687. 278 P 221 (1929) 10 
. Estrada v State. 143 Idaho 558. 149 P.3d 833 (2006) ........................................ 9 
. ................................................................. Illinois v Perkins 496 U.S. 292 (1990) 7 
..................................... Koon v . Bottolfsen. 66 Idaho 771. 169 P.2d 345 (1946) 10 
. McKune v Lile. 536 U.S. 24 (2002) ................................................................ 8 
. ...................................................... Minnesota v Murphy. 465 U.S. 420 (1 984) 7, 8 
. ............................................................. Miranda v Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) 7 
. ............................................. Roe v Hopper. 90 Idaho 22. 408 P.2d 161 (1965) 10 
State Department of Health and Welfare v . Housel. 
.......................................................... 140 Idaho 96. 90 P.3d 321 (2004) 10 
. . . ........................... State v Bottens. 137 Idaho 730. 53 P.3d 875 (Ct App 2002) 10 
State v . Casey. 125 Idaho 856. 876 P.2d 138 (1 994) .......................................... 5 
. . . ....................... . State v Curless. 137 Idaho 138. 44 P.3d 1 193 (Ct App 2002) 7 8 
. State v Farwell. 144 Idaho 732. 170 P.3d 397 (2007) ................................. 11. 12 
....................... . . . State v Goodwin. 131 Idaho 364. 956 P.2d 131 1 (Ct App 1998) 5 
....................................... p128 Idaho 362. 913 P.2d 578 (1 996) 10 
.......................................... . State v Moore. 131 Idaho 814. 965 P.2d 174 (1998) 5 
State v . Moore. 2004 Unpublished Opinion No . 477. 
....................................................... . Docket No 30096 (Idaho App.. 2004) 1 
......................................... State v . Oliver. 144 Idaho 722. 170 P.3d 387 (2007) 12 
. ........................................ State v Rhoades. 134 Idaho 862. 11 P.3d 481 (2000) 6 
State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 79 P.3d 719 (2003) ...................................... 10 
RULES 
I.C.R. 32(h)(l) .................................................................................................... 10 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Waiter E. Moore appeals from the judgment entered upon re-sentencing. 
On appeal he challenges the partial denial of his motion to prevent the 
Department of Correction from considering a PSE. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas 
The state charged Moore with one count of lewd conduct with a child. (R., 
pp. 22-23.) He pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement whereby the state 
agreed to not file additional charges and to make specific sentencing 
recommendations. (R., pp. 28-30.) The court ordered a psychosexual 
evaluation. (R., pp. 35-37.) The report on the evaluation, conducted by North 
Idaho Treatment Associates, Inc., was dated July 31, 2003, and submitted to the 
district court with the PSI ("2003 PSE). (#30096 PSI.) As part of the evaluation 
Moore signed a Psychosexua! Evaluation Agreement in which he was infor~med 
that he had a right to not participate in the evaluation. (#30096 Psychosexual 
Evaluation Agreement.) The district court sentenced Moore to life with 15 years 
fixed. (R., pp. 53-55.) The sentence was affirmed on appeal. State v. Moore, 
2004 Unpublished Opinion No. 477, Docket No. 30096 (Idaho App., 2004). 
Moore was granted post-conviction relief for his counsel's failure to inform 
him of his right to not participate in the PSE. (R., pp. 68-69.) Despite Moore's 
apparent belief that his first psychosexual was conducted in violation of his right 
to not participate in the evaluation, he underwent a second psychosexual 
evaluation. (R., pp. 74-75, 93.) Included with the PSI for his new sentencing 
was the 2003 PSE. (PSI.) Also provided to the court was the new PSE ("2009 
PSE"). The district court, however, sealed the original PSI and 2003 PSE, did 
not consider them in the re-sentencing, and ordered that they not be forwarded to 
the Department of Correction.' (Tr., p. 10, L. 3 - p. 12, L. 19; R., p. 109.) The 
court concluded, however, that it lacked authority to order the Department of 
Correction to take any particular action regarding any documents or information 
already in its possession. (Tr., p. 12, L. 20 - p. 13, L. 5.) The court also stated 
as a ground for partially denying the motion that the right involved was the Fifth 
Amendment right to silence and that a lot of the information Moore was seeking 
to deny the Department was unrelated to the "issue that ultimately has resulted in 
this resentencing." (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 6-1 9.) 
The district court sentenced Moore to life with 13 years fixed. (R., pp. 
116-17.) Moore filed a timely appeal from the judgment. (R., pp. 119-23.) 
' The district court also sealed a 2008 PSI because it had been conducted 
without Moore's counsel being physically present for the interview. (Tr., p. 4, L. 
16-p. 6, L. 24; p. 12, Ls. 13-19.) 
ISSUES 
Moore states the issues on appeal as: 
1) Did the district court err by denying Mr. Moore's motion to 
remove the 2003 PSI from the possession of the IDOC? 
2) Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing a 
unified sentence of life, with thirteen years fixed, upon Mr. Moore, 
following his guilty plea to lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen, 
in light of the mitigating factors present in his case? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1 Has Moore filed to show error in the district court's order because he 
wasn't entitled to even have the district court disregard the 2003 PSI, much less 
entitled to have the Department of Correction do so? 
2. Has Moore failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when 
it imposed a sentence of life with 13 years fixed upon Moore's conviction for lewd 
conduct with a child? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Moore Has Failed To Show Error Because He Was Not Entitled To Have The 
2003 PSI Disreqarded Bv Anvone 
A. Introduction 
The district court sealed the 2003 PSI and 2003 PSE and declined to 
consider them in sentencing. (Tr., p. 10, L. 3 - p. 12, L. 19; R., p. 109.) The 
district court did not order the Department of Correction to take any particular 
action regarding any documents or information already in its possession for two 
reasons. First, it concluded it lacked discretion to order the Department of 
Correction to take any particular action regarding the information in these 
documents. (Tr., p. 12, L. 20 - p. 13, L. 5.) Second, it concluded that at least 
most of the materials in the documents subject to the objection did not actually 
implicate any Fifth Amendment rights. (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 6-19.) 
On appeal Moore challenges only the first of the bases for the district 
court's ruling. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-1 1 .) Because he does not challenge the 
holding that there was no Fifth Amendment violation that would justify the 
requested relief, this Court must affirm on that unchallenged basis. If this Court 
reaches the merits of that issue, review of the law shows that there was no Fifth 
Amendment violation, and therefore no grounds for withholding the information in 
the 2003 PSI or 2003 PSE from the Department of Correction. Finally, Moore's 
appellate argument fails because he has cited to nothing that would give the 
district court the discretion to remove information in the 2003 PSI and 2003 PSE 
from the Department of Correction. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Interpretation of court rules is a question of law reviewed de novo. 
State v. Moore, 131 ldaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998). The appellate 
courts exercise free review of constitutional issues. State v. Casey, 125 ldaho 
856, 876 P.2d 138 (1994). 
C. This Court Should Affirm On The Alternative Basis Provided Bv The 
District Court Because That Basis Is Not Challenaed On Appeal 
Where the district court makes a ruling based upon more than one ground, 
and an appellant challenges only one of those grounds, the appellate court must 
affirm the district court on the uncontested basis for its ruling. State v. Goodwin, 
131 ldaho 364, 366, 956 P.2d 131 1, 1313 (Ct. App. 1998). Because the record 
shows that Moore has not challenged the district court's alternative basis for its 
ruling, he has failed to show error. 
In ruling on Moore's motion, the court stated that "the presentence 
investigation contains a lot of information, some of which is totally and completely 
unrelated to the critical issue that ultimately has resulted in this resentencing. So 
I don't feel that I'm inclined to do anything other than to make sure that we seal 
the [2003 PSI] and we'll make sure that's sealed and is not forwarded to the 
Department of Corrections, as I typically would in these cases." (Tr., p. 13, 1s. 6- 
18.) Because this basis for the district court's ruling is not challenged on appeal, 
this Court must affirm on the alternative basis that there is no underlying Fifth 
Amendment violation that would merit denying the Department of Correction 
access to information in the 2003 PSI or 2003 PSE already in the Department's 
possession. 
In addition, there has never been any finding in this record of any Fifth 
Amendment violation. On the contrary, the re-sentencing was ordered 
exclusively on the Sixth Amendment ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(R., pp. 68-69.) The remedy granted Moore was a resentencing. (Id.) That 
remedy is entitled to be considered res judicata. State v. Rhoades, 134 
Idaho 862, 863, 11 P.3d 481,482 (2000) (the doctrine of res judicata prevents re- 
litigation of issues that have been previously decided in a final judgment or 
decision in an action between the same litigants). Because Moore already has 
been granted a remedy for the ineffective assistance of counsel, he has failed to 
show that he was entitled to an additional remedy. 
The district court concluded that there was no indication that restricting the 
use of the 2003 PSI and 2003 PSE was necessary to address any Fifth 
Amendment issue. Moore has not challenged this conclusion. In addition, 
Moore has failed to argue or cite authority for the proposition that, as a result of 
his counsel's ineffective assistance for failing to inform him of his right against 
compelled self-incrimination, he is entitled to an additional remedy beyond that 
already granted in the form of a re-sentencing. Because Moore has not 
challenged the district court's alternative basis for its holding, he has failed to 
show error. 
D. Moore Has Failed To Show Anv Violation Of His Riqht Aqainst Com~elled 
Self-Incrimination Or That Restriction On The Use Of The 2003 PSI Or 
2003 PSE Would Flow From ineffective Assistance Of Counsel 
Even if the merits of the court's alternative holding were to be considered, 
Moore has failed to show that he would be entitled to prevent consideration of the 
2003 PSI and 2003 PSE by the Department of Correction. On the contrary, he 
had already been granted the only remedy to which he was entitled. 
Moore has failed to show any violation of his right against compelled self- 
I 
I incrimination. "The Fifth Amendment, by its terms, prevents a person from being 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself or herself." State 
I 
v. Curless, 137 ldaho 138, 143,44 P.3d 1193, 1198 (Ct. App. 2002). The Fifth 
Amendment speaks of compulsion, and thus does not preclude a witness from 
testifying voluntarily in matters that may incriminate him or her. Minnesota v. 
Mur~hv, 465 U.S. 420,427 (1984). Therefore, in order to enjoy the protections of 
the Fifth Amendment, an individual must generally assert the privilege by 
remaining silent. Id_ In cases such as this one, where the defendant did not 
remain silent, the application of one of two exceptions must be shown. Id_ 
The first exception applies to custodial interrogations. "In those 
circumstances, the Fifth Amendment requires the exclusion of incriminating 
statements obtained during custodial interrogation unless the suspect fails to 
claim the Fifth Amendment privilege after being [Mirandized]." Curless, 137 
ldaho at 145, 44 P.3d at 1198 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). 
This rule applies, however, only when the interrogation is in a "police-dominated 
atmosphere." Illinois v. Perkins 496 U.S. 292, 295 (1990) (citing Miranda, 384 
U.S. at 445). This exception does not apply to Moore's case because there is no 
indication that the psychosexual evaluation was performed in a "police- 
dominated atmosphere." 
The second exception applies where assertion of the privilege "is 
penalized so as to foreclose a free choice to remain silent, and compel a witness 
to give incriminating testimony." Curless, 137 Idaho at 143, 44 P.3d at 1198 
(citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434 (1984)). As noted, Moore was 
informed that he was under no obligation to undergo the PSE. (#30096 
Psychosexual Evaluation Agreement.) In the context of future parole (the context 
under which the 2003 PSE would be considered by the Department of 
Correction), loss of prison privileges as a result of refusal to take part in a 
rehabilitative program that would require the defendant to admit guilt for the 
crime for which he was convicted as well as to give a full accounting of prior 
sexual activity (including crimes) does not constitute coercion under the Fifth 
Amendment. McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35-45 (2002). There is nothing in the 
record indicating that Moore was "compelied" as prohibited by the Fifth 
Amendment. The order setting up the PSE contains nothing either mandating 
cooperation or penalizing Moore for any lack thereof. (R., pp. 35-37.) 
The record in this case does not support any claim that the 2003 PSE was 
taken in derogation of Moore's Fifth Amendment rights against compelled self- 
incrimination. The record does not show that Moore has ever even claimed that 
the 2003 PSE resulted from compelled self-incrimination. The only violation of 
Moore's rights was an Estrada violation (R., p. 68), meaning a violation of 
Moore's right to effective assistance of counsel. _See Estrada v. State, 143 ldaho 
558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006). Moore has failed to show that there was any violation 
of the Fifth Amendment such that the Department of Correction would be barred 
from considering the 2003 PSI or 2003 PSE. 
Moore has also failed to show that preventing the Department of 
Correction from making use of the 2003 PSI or 2003 PSE would be a proper 
remedy for the Esfrada violation. As noted above, the remedy granted, a re- 
sentencing, has become res judicafa. in addition, the remedy granted in Estrada 
was a re-sentencing. Estrada, 143 ldaho at 565, 149 P.3d at 840. Finally, the 
concern of the Court in Estrada was that the psychosexual evaluation would be 
used to enhance the sentence. Id. at 564, 149 P.3d at 839. Moore failed to 
demonstrate to the district court (or on appeal) that prohibiting the Department of 
Correction from reviewing the 2003 PSI or 2003 PSE was a proper remedy for 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to inform Moore of his right to silence 
vis-a-vis the 2003 PSE. 
Because Moore failed to establish any basis for his motion that the 
Department of Correction be prohibited from reviewing or relying on the 2003 PSI 
or 2003 PSE, Moore has failed to show error in the district court's ruling that it 
would not so order. 
E. Moore Has Failed To Show That The District Court Had Discretion To 
Order The Department Of Correction To Disreaard The 2003 PSI Or 2003 
PSE -
Moore argwes that I.C.R. 32(h)(l) confers discretion on the district court to - 
require the Department of Correction to return the PSI. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5- 
7.) This argument is without merit. 
It is axiomatic and long-established that a statute will be interpreted 
according to its plain language, and that where the language is plain the court will 
not resort to principles of statutory construction. State Department of Health and 
Welfare v. Housei, 140 ldaho 96, 103, 90 P.3d 321, 328 (2004); State v. 
Schwartz, 139 ldaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003); State v. McCoy, 128 
ldaho 362,365,913 P.2d 578,581 (1996); Roe v. Hopper, 90 ldaho 22,27,408 
P.2d 161, 166 (1 965); Koon v. Bottolfsen, 66 ldaho 771, 169 P.2d 345 (1 946); 
Burnham v. Henderson, 47 ldaho 687, 278 P. 221 (1929). Likewise, rules of 
procedure are to be given meaning according to their plain language. See State 
v. Bottens, 137 ldaho 730,732, 53 P.3d 875, 877 (Ct. App. 2002). 
The relevant language of the applicable procedural rule is that the PSI 
"shall be available to the ldaho Department of Corrections so long as the 
defendant is committed to or supervised by the Department ...." I.C.R. 32(h)(l) 
(emphasis added). The plain language of this rule does not grant discretion to 
the court; on the contrary it makes availability of the PSI mandatory. Moore's 
argument that I.C.R. 32(h)(l) granted the court discretion to decide whether the 




Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
The district court imposed a life sentence with 13 years fixed upon 
Moore's conviction For lewd conduct with a child. (R., pp. 116-17.) Moore 
contends the district court abused its discretion because it "failed to adequately 
consider" Moore's lack of a criminal record; his claim of having taken full 
responsibility for his actions; and his efforts at education and training while in 
prison. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-14.) A review of the record shows Moore has 
failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its sentencing discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. Id. 
C. Moore Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencinq 
Discretion 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was 
excessive. State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To 
establish that the sentence was excessive, he must demonstrate that reasonable 
minds could not conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the 
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. 
Farwell, 144 ldaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. In determining whether the appellant 
met his burden, the court considers the entire sentence but, because the 
decision to release him on parole is exclusively the province of the executive 
branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual 
incarceration. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). 
Moore repeatedly sexually abused the six-year-old son of his niece while 
providing day-care for the child. (PSI, pp. 1-2.) 
Based on police reports and victim statements, Mr. Moore 
performed fellatio on his six-year-old victim on multiple occasions 
and photographed his victim white engaged in sexual acts. The 
police report indicates that they found several child pornographic 
videotapes and several envelopes containing computer printouts of 
small nude children. They also reported finding a Rubbermaid 
container containing several pair of small underwear on which were 
written the names and ages of children. 
(213109 PSE, p. 5.) He probably also molested the victim's four-year-old brother. 
(Tr., p. 29, L. 24 - p. 33, i. 2.) 
Moore refused to discuss the facts of the case with the evaluator. (213109 
PSE, p. 5.) In testing, Moore's responses to the Sexual Adjustment Inventory 
suggested that "he is deliberately minimizing his problems and concerns ...." 
(213109 PSE, p. 6.) He was diagnosed with "Pedophilia Attracted to Males, 
Nonexclusive type" with "Obsessive Compulsive Personality Features." (213109 
PSE, p. 3.) The polygraph report indicated deception to questions about whether 
there were other victims he had not disclosed; whether there were undisclosed 
sexually deviant behaviors; and whether he was lying about the number of 
individuals he had sexually abused. (1130109 Polygraph Report.) The 
psychosexual examiner concluded: "Mr. Moore's level of risk is high enough to 
require close monitoring of his behavior and therapeutic intervention. It is this 
evaluator's opinion that at the discretion of the court Mr. Moore should be kept 
under sex offender supervision for as long a time as possible." (2131098 PSE, p. 
13.) 
The district court in sentencing specifically considered Moore's character, 
the nature of the offense, and the sentencing factors, especially protection of the 
community. (Tr., p. 44, Ls. 2-20.) The court characterized the crime as 
"egregious" given the young age of the victim. (Tr., p. 44, L. 21 - p. 45, L. 4.) 
Given the vulnerability of children, protection of the community was a special 
consideration. (Tr., p. 45, Ls. 4-1 5.) The crime was also very serious due to the 
harm caused the victim. (Tr., p. 47, Ls. 18-23.) 
The court considered the risk of future offense, finding the risk 
"substantial" if Moore did not rehabilitate. (Tr., p. 47, L. 24 - p. 48, L. 19.) The 
court was concerned by the deception result of the polygraph, but noted that 
such deception was "not that uncommon" give the "magnitude of the problem." 
(Tr., p. 48, L. 20 - p. 49, L. I.) The court recognized the need for "intensive 
treatment" before Moore would be able to be released back into society. (Tr., p. 
49, Ls. 19-25.) 
In choosing the particular sentence, the court concluded that the 
seriousness of the crime would be diminished by a lesser sentence. (Tr., p. 50, 
Ls. 2-5.) A long period of supervision to assure the level and type of 
programming necessary to protect society was also deemed necessary. (Tr., p. 
50, Ls. 5-1 5.) The court thereupon imposed and executed a sentence of life with 
13 years fixed. (Tr., p. 50, Ls. 16-21 .) 
Moore argues that his claims that he was physically and sexually abused 
as a child show an abuse of discretion. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12.) Moore 
asserted in the PSI, however, that his parents "took great care" of him and his 
siblings and are "very supportive of him." (PSI, p. 4.) He claimed only one 
incidence of physical abuse. (Id.) He stated that it is "possible" he was molested 
because his brother was molested by a family friend. (Id.) Although he did claim 
during his polygraph interview to have been victimized once by an older boy, he 
also ultimately tested deceptive in relation to his sexual history. (1130109 
Polygraph Report.) Moore has failed to show that the district court misperceived 
his character when imposing sentence. (Tr., p. 44, Ls. 2-16.) 
Moore next argues that that the "district court failed to adequately 
consider" his lack of a prior criminal record. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) The district 
court specifically considered this, however, noting that there was nothing there 
"other than this offense." (Tr., p. 44, Ls. 2-7.) This argument is belied by the 
record. 
Finally, Moore points out his claims of remorse and rehabilitation. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 12-14.) Again, however, the district court specifically 
considered as "positive things" Moore's stated remorse and claimed desire to 
pursue treatment. (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 5-19.) Moore's argument is again affirmatively 
disproved by the record. 
Moore has failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion. Moore committed a horrendous crime of abusing a very young child 
and there is a great deal of evidence that there have been other victims, 
including child pornography and "trophies." The court weighed both the need to 
protect society and the possibility of rehabilitation and concluded that a period of 
incarceration of 13 years was required to avoid minimizing the crime, while the 
indeterminate period of life offered the possibility of rehabilitation with 
supervision. The sentence is reasonable under all the facts of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of 
conviction and sentence. 
DATED this 26th day of April 2 
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